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Lex Luthor Wins: 




When Superman was created in 1938, there had never been a character quite like 
him.1  His arrival marked the first appearance of a superhero, setting off a trend 
that would come to dominate the comic book medium, one of the few distinctly 
American art forms, for the next seven decades.2  As befitting his larger than life 
adventures, the fictional character Superman spread across all communicative 
media, from the comic page to the radio serial, animation, live action television and 
motion pictures.3 
Superman began as the brainchild of Jerome Siegel and Joe Shuster, two like-
minded sons of Jewish immigrants who met and befriended one another while 
attending the same Cleveland, Ohio high school.4  After many fitful stops and 
starts, and multiple interested publishers, Siegel and Shuster eventually brought the 
otherworldly Superman, the “last son of Krypton,” to Detective Comics, Inc. (“DC 
Comics” or “DC”), where he remains to this day.5 
The “Man of Steel’s” colossal and unforeseen success has thrust DC and the 
Siegel and Shuster heirs (and the creators themselves, while they were still living) 
into a seemingly never-ending battle over the copyright to the character.6  Critical 
to this legal battle is the termination of transfer provision created in the Copyright 
Act of 1976, which grants the creators’ heirs the ability to recapture the rights the 
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 1. LES DANIELS, SUPERMAN:  THE COMPLETE HISTORY:  THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE MAN OF 
STEEL 11 (2d ed., Chronicle Books 2004) (1998). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1112–17 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
(detailing the extensive litigation history between the original creators and heirs against DC from 1947 
to 2004). 
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duo granted to DC over seventy years ago.7 
The termination battle over Superman has thrown into sharp relief copyright 
law’s uncomfortable treatment of fictional characters and the protectability of such 
characters separate from the works in which they appear.8  Now that the Siegel 
heirs have successfully terminated the original Superman assignment, the heirs, 
along with DC, are co-owners of the copyright to Action Comics #1, the first 
appearance of Superman, through the Shuster interest that DC still possesses.9  But 
if and when the Shuster heirs’ termination becomes effective in 2013, the question 
will arise: what Superman property interests will the parties be left with after that 
date?10 
This Note proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes the legal provisions and case 
law that allow for the heirs of Jerome Siegel to exercise termination rights over the 
Superman works.  Specifically, it examines copyright law’s uncertain treatment of 
characters as copyrightable works separate from the works in which they appear, 
especially in the case of characters appearing in works of serial fiction.11  It then 
discusses the implications for the termination right when some, but not all, of a 
character’s adventures are recaptured via termination.  Part II describes the history 
of Superman and the real life battle over his future between the estates of the 
original creators and DC Comics.  Part III discusses how the termination right has 
been applied to Superman in the case of the Siegel heirs and, prospectively, the 
legal implications for the character once the Shuster termination takes effect in 
2013.  This Part argues that once the 2013 termination takes effect, the Siegel and 
Shuster heirs and DC will be left with fragments of the Superman character that 
cannot be easily exploited by any party.  Such an outcome is ultimately undesirable 
for the law, the parties and the public.  The Note concludes by proposing some 
potential solutions to this problem. 
 7. See id. at 1113–14 ("[T]he 1976 Act gave artists and their heirs the ability to terminate any 
prior grants of the rights to their creations that were executed before January 1, 1978 . . . . It is this right 
of termination that Joanne Siegel and Laura Siegel Larson now seek to vindicate in this case." (emphasis 
in original)). 
 8. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (2009). 
The issue of whether a character from a work of fiction is protectable apart from the story in which 
such character appears is in a sense more properly framed as relating to the degree of substantial 
similarity required to constitute infringement rather than in terms of copyrightability per se. 
However, the increasing prevalence of ‘sequels’ in novels, motion pictures and television wherein 
characters from a prior work are used in an otherwise completely new work renders it appropriate 
to consider the copyrightability of a character apart from the original work in which the character 
appeared. 
Id. 
 9. See Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (“Thus, although defendants retain the unfettered right to 
exploit the works (and retain the profits derived therefrom) in foreign nations, they may do so 
domestically only as a co-owner (through Shuster's share) of the works.”). 
 10. See id. at 1114 n.3 (“According to documents filed with the United States Copyright Office, 
Mark Warren Peary, the son of Shuster's sister and the court-appointed representative of the Shuster 
estate, has given notice of the estate's intent to terminate the 1938 grant of the Superman copyright to 
Detective Comics and its successors effective 2013.”) 
 11. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, §2.12. 
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I.  COPYRIGHT HISTORY 
A.  DURATION UNDER COPYRIGHT ACTS OF 1790 AND 1909 
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution gives Congress the power to “Promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”12  
The task of Congress is to define the scope of that limited monopoly in order to 
balance the interests of authors on the one hand, and the public purpose of the 
Copyright Clause on the other.13  Authors’ interests are supported by copyright’s 
grant of certain exclusive rights, including the right to create derivative works 
based on the authors’ preexisting works.14  Perhaps the strongest concession to the 
public’s interest in these works is the limited duration of the monopoly granted by 
copyright.15  When the term of a copyrighted work expires, the work enters the 
public domain and can be reproduced and used in new creative works by anyone.16  
The Copyright Act of 1790 gave authors protection for fourteen years and a 
renewal term of an additional fourteen years.17  If the work was not renewed, it fell 
into the public domain.18 
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, an author was entitled to twenty-eight years of 
protection from the date of publication and could renew the copyright for another 
twenty-eight year term during the final year of the first term.19  Congress intended 
to correct a bargaining power imbalance between authors and publishers by 
granting authors this right to renegotiate after the initial term or to take their work 
elsewhere.20  The Supreme Court held in Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 13. Id.  See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(finding that “it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited 
monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . in order to give the public appropriate access to their 
work product”). 
 14. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 15. Id. § 302. 
 16. See 17 U.S.C. § 302.  See also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 9.11 (discussing the 
lengthening duration of copyright terms which have had the effect of delaying expiration of term for 
copyrighted works to enter the public domain). 
 17. Copyright Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Copyright Act of 1909, §§ 23–24, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version 
at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)). 
 20. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 
The need for such a second bite at the apple flowed from the fact that the 1909 Act created a dual 
term in the copyright to a work, one realized upon the work's publication and the second occurring 
twenty-eight years later with the copyright's renewal.  Justification for this splitting of terms was 
based, in part, on the understanding that an author's ability to realize the true value of his or her's 
work was often not apparent at its creation, but required the passage of time (and the marketing 
efforts by a publisher) to materialize. The renewal term in the copyright to the work thus served as 
a mid-course re-valuation tool allowing the author, by giving him or her the right of renewal in the 
      work, leverage in re-negotiating a better deal with the original grantee or any other suitor who 
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Sons that this right of renewal was assignable in the initial term of copyright, as 
long as the author was alive at the time of renewal.21  In practice, this decision 
allowed publishers to use their initial bargaining power to require authors to sign 
away the renewal right at the outset of the contractual relationship, defeating the 
remunerative purpose of having the renewal term.22 
B.  THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 AND THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT 
(CTEA) 
The Copyright Act of 1976 changed the duration of most works of authorship to 
one term of life plus fifty years.23  The formalities of registration and notice in the 
previous copyright system caused many works to enter the public domain 
inadvertently at the time of publication.24  Under the 1976 revisions, these 
formalities were largely dispensed with and copyright attached to any original work 
the moment it became fixed in a tangible medium of expression.25 
To replicate the ability of authors to recapture works as originally intended 
under the 1909 renewal term, the termination of transfer provision was added.26  
Unlike the previous renewal term system, the termination right is very difficult to 
lose and cannot be contracted away.27 
Section 304(c) created a “retroactive” right of termination, whereby authors like 
Jerome Siegel and Joe Shuster could terminate assignments of works copyrighted 
under the 1909 Act, so long as those works would be covered under the extended 
renewal term and not otherwise in the public domain.28  A number of formalities 
desired to continue to market the copyright.Id. 
 21. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).  The case involved the 
renewal rights of the song “When Irish Eyes are Smiling.”  Id. at 645.  Five years after the copyright was 
first obtained, one of the authors assigned to Witmark the renewal right in the song.  Id. at 646.  When 
that author later renewed the rights to the song in the twenty-eighth year of the initial term, Witmark 
filed for an injunction.  Id.  The Court determined that authors could assign their renewal interests, but 
that such assignment was not effective if the author died before renewal.  Id. at 651.  The decision was 
motivated at least in part by a rejection of state paternalism over creators’ economic decision making.  
Id. at 657 (“While authors may have habits making for intermittent want, they may have no less a spirit 
of independence which would resent treatment of them as wards under guardianship of the law.”). 
 22. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (“This re-valuation mechanism provided by the renewal term 
under the 1909 Act was largely frustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Fred Fisher Music, 
allowing authors to assign away at the outset all of their rights to both the initial and the renewal term.”  
(internal citation omitted)). 
 23. Copyright Act of 1976, § 302(a), Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (current version at 
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
 24. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 9.11[A]. 
 25. Copyright Act of 1976 § 102(a). 
 26. Id. §§ 203(a), 304(c). 
 27. Id. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (“Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any 
agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.”).  See 
also Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 201-202 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that where a 
later grant of rights terminates and supersedes a pre-1978 grant, the termination rights provided by § 
304(d) cannot be applied).  Publishers could arguably draft contract provisions requiring authors to 
regrant their rights after successful termination, but no court has passed on the enforceability of such a 
provision. 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (2006).  See also Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 
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accompany the exercise of the new termination right.  Authors or their heirs have a 
five-year window to file for termination, between the fifty-sixth and sixty-first 
years after the copyright was originally secured.29  Termination notices must be 
sent to transferees or their successors in interest two to ten years before a 
termination can be effectuated.30  Termination notices must comply with a number 
of Copyright Office regulations in order to successfully terminate a grant.31  If 
authors or their heirs successfully navigate the formalistic requirements of the 
termination of transfer provision, they have recaptured the copyright in the original 
work “against all odds.”32 
Section 304(c) created an express exception in cases of works for hire.33  In 
order for a creative work to be deemed a work for hire, it must be created by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment.34  Alternatively, the work of 
an independent creator may be deemed a work for hire if there is a written 
agreement between author and publisher and the work fits into one of nine statutory 
categories.35  The practical effect of a work’s designation as a work for hire is that 
the publisher becomes the statutory author of the work.36  Consequently, there 
would be no transfer between author and publisher to terminate in cases of works 
for hire.37 
Creators and publishers in the “Golden Age of Comics” rarely specified whether 
artworks prepared for comics were works for hire.38  The task of determining the 
meaning of “works made for hire” and “employer” under the Copyright Act was 
left to the courts.39  Courts use the “instance and expense” test to determine 
whether works were made for hire under the 1909 Act.40  The “instance and 
1036, 1041 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“The complexity of the 1976 Act’s termination procedures stems as much 
from the fact that those provisions intersect with and must be construed in light of the body of copyright 
law that existed at the time the works were created (here, the 1909 Copyright Act) . . . .”). 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3). 
 30. Id. § 304(c)(4)(A). 
 31. Id. § 304(c)(4)(B) (specifying that the notice “shall comply, in form, content, and manner of 
service” required by the Register of Copyrights). 
 32. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101–02 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting 
2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 7:52 (2007)). 
 33. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c). 
 34. Id. § 101. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. §§ 201(b), 304(c).  See also Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t. Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 
1056 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (explaining that the termination provision of § 304(c) could not extend to works 
made for hire “because the copyright in such a creation never belonged to the artist in the first instance 
to grant; instead, it belonged at the outset to the party that commissioned the work”). 
 37. See Siegel, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.  
 38. GEOFF KLOCK, HOW TO READ SUPERHERO COMICS AND WHY 2 (2002) (“The distinction 
between the [Golden Age and Silver Age] periods is as blurry as the distinction between any two 
movements in the history of literature or art . . . . The golden age was the birth of the superhero proper 
out of the pulp novel characters of the early 1930s and was primarily associated with the DC Comics 
Group.”). 
 39. See Siegel, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 1041–42 (commenting that the law developed by the courts 
under the 1909 Act was “oftentimes confused and not well-delineated, with its dimension continuing to 
evolve long after the effective date of the 1976 Act”). 
 40. See Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965). 
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expense” test balances three factors:  whether the motivating factor in producing 
the work was the employer who induced its creation, whether the hiring party had 
the power to accept, reject, modify or otherwise control the creation of the work 
and at whose expense the work was created.41  Because the parties cannot deem a 
work a work for hire retrospectively, Golden Age creator Joe Simon in Marvel 
Characters, Inc. v. Simon was not estopped from raising a termination action for 
the equally iconic Captain America character.42  The court made this decision 
despite prior settlement agreements between the parties stipulating that he had done 
the work as an “employee for hire.”43 
C.  THE CHARACTER COPYRIGHT 
Circuits conflict concerning the extent to which characters are entitled to 
copyright protection apart from the works in which they appear.44  The Second 
Circuit uses the “distinctively delineated” standard formulated by Judge Learned 
Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.; this test is a close cousin to the 
idea/expression doctrine.45  The Ninth Circuit uses the more stringent “story being 
told” standard in Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 
Inc., holding that the famous hard-boiled detective character Sam Spade was not 
copyrightable.46 
Graphic characters appear to have an easier time gaining copyright, in contrast 
to their literary counterparts.47  For Example, the Ninth Circuit in Walt Disney 
Productions v. Air Pirates held that Mickey Mouse and other Disney cartoons were 
protected by copyright apart from the stories in which they appeared.48  It is not 
clear whether Air Pirates signaled a retreat from the Sam Spade case, or whether 
the court simply thought Mickey satisfied the “story being told” test.49  In the 
 41. See Siegel, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (“Toward that end, the instance and expense test requires 
the evaluation of three factors:  (1) At whose instance the work was prepared; (2) whether the hiring 
party had the power to accept, reject, modify, or otherwise control the creation of the work; and (3) at 
whose expense the work was created.” (citing Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 
F.3d 869, 879, 881 (9th Cir. 2005))). 
 42. See Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 291–92 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 43. Id. 
 44. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.12. 
 45. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding that the copyright in 
a play was not infringed by a similar play that told a similar story because the defendant only used 
uncopyrightable “stock characters” that did not meet the “distinctively delineated” standard); see also 
Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the parodic 
character “The Greatest American Hero” was sufficiently dissimilar from Superman due to his timid and 
reluctant nature, despite sharing many character elements such as super powers). 
 46. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954) 
(holding that if a literary character was merely a “chessman” moved around by plot alone, it would not 
be copyrightable; characters had to “really constitute[] the story being told” in order to achieve 
copyright protection). 
 47. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.12. 
 48. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 
(1979). 
 49. Id. at 755 (“[C]omic book characters therefore are distinguishable from literary characters, the 
Warner Brothers language does not preclude protection of Disney's characters.”). 
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Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner in Gaiman v. McFarlane stated that a specific name, 
appearance, set of behaviors and speech pattern were enough for a comic book 
character to achieve copyright protection.50  Judge Augustus Hand in Detective 
Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc. held that the Fox Features character 
Wonderman infringed on Superman, who was more than a “mere delineation of a 
benevolent Hercules” and deserved copyright protection.51 
1.  Characters in a Series of Works 
Comic book characters like Superman are conceived as characters that will 
appear in multiple creative works.52  The copyright law’s treatment of sequels is 
therefore an important component of a comic book character’s protection.  Sequels 
use characters from prior works to generate a new work, normally, by telling the 
continuing adventures of that character in an otherwise completely new work.53  A 
subsequent work in a series can be characterized as a derivative work of the 
original.54  The first work in a series might delineate a character enough to create a 
copyright for that character separate from the work itself.55 
In Anderson v. Stallone, an unauthorized script for a new sequel infringed the 
movie character Rocky because the unauthorized script was a derivative work; and, 
under § 106(2), Stallone had the exclusive right to prepare derivative works.56  This 
was the case even though the script contained original expression.57  The Stallone 
court also signaled its acceptance of Judge Hand’s Nichols standard when it stated, 
the “Rocky characters are one of the most highly delineated group of characters in 
modern American cinema.”58 
Judge Newman’s concurring opinion in Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
Inc. stated that, assuming Tarzan was a distinctively delineated character, the 
delineation of the character was complete in the first book published in 1912.59  
The fact that the Burroughs’ heirs terminated only thirty out of thirty-five Tarzan 
books would not prevent them from recapturing the character of Tarzan because the 
first book was included among the terminated works.60 
 50. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 51. Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433–34 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 52. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he 
letters from Detective Comics' executives in January and April, 1938, indicate that the Superman 
material first published in Action Comics No. 1 was not intended to be a one-shot deal, but rather was 
conceived of as an ongoing ‘new feature’ to which sequels would need to be fashioned.”). 
 53. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.12. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006); Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
 57. Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d. at 1162. 
 58. Id. at 1166. 
 59. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 631 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., 
concurring). 
 60. Id. 
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2.  Characters in a Series and the Public Domain 
When an original author uses the same character in a series, and some of the 
works enter the public domain while others remain protected, can a subsequent 
author create a new work using that character without infringing the copyrights of 
the original author?  The answer appears to be “Yes, as long as the first work with 
that character is in the public domain.”61  The sequels (or derivative works) that 
have not yet passed into the public domain retain copyright protection for the 
original elements they add to the character.62 
As one illustration, Dr. Fu Manchu, the classic “yellow peril” villain, first 
appeared in a short story titled “The Zayat Kiss,” published in 1912.63  The story 
was later included among a collection of stories about the character and published 
as a book, The Mystery of Dr. Fu-Manchu, in 1913.64  The first three Fu Manchu 
books were published before 1922 and presumably are within the public domain in 
the United States.65  The remaining ten books are still protected by copyright.66  A 
subsequent creator could use the character as described in the first three books, but 
using any elements of the character introduced in later books (such as his villainous 
daughter) would run the risk of infringing the later works that are still protected by 
copyright.67  Similarly, assuming the new work was a graphic work, a subsequent 
creator would have to avoid basing his version of Dr. Fu Manchu on the film 
version of the character, which is yet another derivative work that is still protected 
by copyright law.68 Furthermore, the laws of trademark and unfair competition 
could remain as barriers to a subsequent creator.69 
D.  DERIVATIVE WORKS AND JOINT WORKS 
Derivative works are copyrightable to the extent that they add sufficiently new 
expression to the preexisting work, assuming that the underlying work was used 
 61. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.12. 
 62. Id. 
 63. A. ROBERT LEE, UNITED STATES:  RE-VIEWING AMERICAN MULTICULTURAL LITERATURE 
153 (2009); SAX ROHMER, THE ZAYAT KISS (1912). 
 64. Dr. Lawrence J. Knapp, The Page of Fu Manchu, NJEDGE.NET, http://www.njedge.net/ 
~knapp/FuFrames.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2010). 
 65. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 9.11 (“Works first published in 1922 entered the 
public domain at the end of 1997, before the amendment was enacted.  Accordingly, works first 
published through the end of 1922 remain unprotected today.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.12. 
 68. See id.  The subsequent creator would have to follow the literary description of the character 
instead: 
Imagine a person, tall, lean and feline, high-shouldered, with a brow like Shakespeare and a face 
like Satan, a close-shaven skull, and long, magnetic eyes of the true cat-green.  Invest him with 
all the cruel cunning of an entire Eastern race, accumulated in one giant intellect, with all the 
resources of science past and present . . . . Imagine that awful being, and you have a mental 
picture of Dr. Fu- Manchu, the yellow peril incarnate in one man. 
Knapp, supra note 64, (quoting SAX ROHMER, THE INSIDIOUS DR. FU MANCHU 366–67 (1913)). 
 69. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.12. 
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with permission or was in the public domain to begin with.70  The originality 
requirement for derivative works is stiffer than that for copyrightable works 
generally in that there must be a nontrivial contribution to the preexisting work.71  
Additionally, the copyright owner has the exclusive right to prepare derivative 
works based upon his or her own copyrighted works.72  However, the ability to 
prepare derivative works, along with other rights guaranteed by copyright, is shared 
by two or more authors in the case of joint works.73  Comics are often the result of 
collaboration between author and artist and thus the product of joint authorship 
under copyright law.74 
Under the 1909 Act, each joint author of a copyrightable work was a co-owner 
of the work and possessed an undivided ownership interest in the entire work.75  
This meant that a co-owner had the legal right to grant a license or transfer his 
rights to a third party without any other co-owner’s permission.76  Under the 1909 
Act, if one author created a work with an expectation that it would later be joined 
with another author’s contribution, it could still be considered a joint work.77  The 
1976 Act explicitly disallowed this form of anticipatory joint authorship.78 
The federal appeals courts of the United States have interpreted the test of joint 
authorship differently.  The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that joint 
authorship requires that each author make an independently copyrightable 
contribution.79  In contrast, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in 
Gaiman, stated in dicta that two authors could jointly create a character protected 
by copyright in a mixed medium such as comics or motion pictures, even if, 
 70. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).  See also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 
(2d Cir. 1980).  
First, to support a copyright the original aspects of a derivative work must be more than trivial.  
Second, the scope of protection afforded a derivative work must reflect the degree to which it 
relies on preexisting material and must not in any way affect the scope of any copyright 
protection in that preexisting material. Thus the only aspects of Tomy's Disney figures [of 
Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck and Pluto] entitled to copyright protection are the non-trivial, 
original features, if any, contributed by the author or creator of these derivative works. 
Id. 
 71. Durham, 630 F.2d at 910 (holding that a derivative work is not independently protectable if 
there is “no independent creation, no distinguishable variation from preexisting works, nothing 
recognizably the author's own contribution”). 
 72. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work.”); 
Id. § 106(2) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize 
any of the following:  . . . to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work . . . .”). 
 74. See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The contents of a comic book 
are typically the joint work of four artists—the writer, the penciler who creates the art work . . . , the 
inker . . . and the colorist who colors it.”). 
 75. Siegel v. Time Warner Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (adopting the rule that each 
contribution to a joint work must be independently copyrightable, at least in part “to prevent some 
spurious claims by those who might otherwise try to share the fruits of the efforts of a sole author of a 
copyrightable work”); see also S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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standing alone, the independent contributions were not copyrightable.80 
Critical for the purposes of the termination action, derivative works prepared 
under authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under 
the terms of the grant after its termination.81  Armed with this post-termination 
exception for continued use, former licensees are able to exploit at least the 
authorized derivative works they created while the preexisting work was in their 
possession.82  However, the statute closes the door on preparation of new 
derivative works based on works covered by the terminate 83
This is hardly the end of the matter, however.  The court in Burroughs decided 
that because the Burroughs heirs had failed to include five titles featuring the 
Tarzan character in their termination notice, the former licensee was allowed to 
create a film based on the nonterminated works.84  This was in spite of the fact that 
a film based on one of the sequels would inevitably include elements of the 
original, terminated work—which the licensee no longer had authority to use.85  
The court elected to find an implicit grant of rights to the earlier work.86  The result 
allowed MGM to move forward on the creation of a cinematic derivative work 
based on a sequel derivative work, despite the successful termination of the original 
underlying work, which contained the Tarzan character’s initial delineation. 
E.  SUMMARY 
The Burroughs decision does considerable violence to the Siegel and Shuster 
heirs’ termination right if its logic is extended to the Superman facts.  While the 
Siegel heirs have successfully terminated Action Comics #1 and a handful of other 
strips, the vast majority of the Superman material exists as unterminable works for 
hire owned by DC.87  For a character as ubiquitous as the Man of Steel, this means 
tens of thousands of sequels can serve as the basis for DC’s attempt to prepare new 
derivative works after the creators’ heirs successfully terminate DC’s remaining 
half interest in Action Comics #1. 
 80. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 81. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (2006) (“A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant 
before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but 
this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 622 (“When an author grants the rights to a work that contains material protected by the 
author’s copyright in an earlier work, the grant implicitly authorizes the use of all material contained in 
the licensed work, including material that may be covered by the author’s other copyrights.”). 
 87. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“It is 
clear to the Court that all of the comic book material produced by Siegel and Shuster after they signed 
the employment agreement with Detective Comics were works made for hire.” (emphasis in original)). 
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II.  BACKGROUND OF SUPERMAN COPYRIGHT BATTLES 
A.  HISTORY 
Jerome Siegel and Joe Shuster attended the same high school in Cleveland, 
Ohio, where the pair was united by a common interest in science fiction tales and 
jungle hero adventure stories.88  The pair began discussing the idea of a character 
named Superman in the early 1930s.89  In 1933, Siegel published a science fiction 
story titled, “The Reign of Superman,” where the eponymous character is a bald 
headed villain with strange mental powers.90 
Siegel and Shuster created the more familiar Superman character in 1934.91  
After shopping the character around to various publishers (including DC Comics), 
Superman was finally published by McClure Newspaper Syndicate as a Milwaukee 
newspaper comic strip.92 Warner Brothers (then Detective Comics) sought comic 
strip material to create a long form comic book and eventually settled on 
Superman.93  Siegel and Shuster were directed to expand and reformat their 
material, which was published as Action Comics #1 in 1938.94 
Superman’s debut appearance established that he was an infant refugee from an 
unnamed alien planet that had been “destroyed by old age.”95  Raised in an 
orphanage on Earth, he discovered he had abilities “millions of years advanced of” 
human beings, including super strength, bulletproof skin, the power to leap an 
eighth of a mile, hurdle a twenty story building and run faster than an express 
train.96  Taking the name Clark Kent and disguising himself as a newspaper 
reporter for the Daily Star, his alter ego Superman saves an innocent woman who is 
about to be executed, rescues fellow reporter Lois Lane from a gangster after 
feigning cowardice as Clark Kent and terrorizes a corrupt lobbyist by running 
across telephone wires with the helpless villain dangling in tow.97  The superhero 
was born. 
Shortly before the publication of Action Comics #1, Siegel and Schuster entered 
 88. STEPHEN KRENSKY, COMIC BOOK CENTURY:  THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN COMIC BOOKS 17 
(2008).  That jungle hero was Tarzan, who by the 1930s had become a comic strip star himself.  Id.  Not 
coincidentally, Tarzan would also become the subject of his own termination action by the 1980s.  See 
generally Burroughs, 683 F.2d 610. 
 89. KRENSKY, supra note 88, at 17. 
 90. Id. at 17–18.  The character was not only a proto-Superman, but also might have been the 
spiritual predecessor to other important Siegel creations, including bald headed and mentally powered 
Superman villains the Ultra-Humanite and Lex Luthor.  Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't. Inc., 542 F. 
Supp. 2d 1098, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“This initial superman character in villain trappings was drawn 
by Shuster as a bald-headed mad man.”). 
 91. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1104–05. 
 92. Siegel, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 1048–54. 
 93. Id. at 1044–48. 
 94. Id. at 1047. 
 95. Jerome Siegel & Joe Shuster, Superman, ACTION COMICS 1, June 1938, at 1, available at 
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~UG02/yeung/actioncomics/cover.html. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 2–13. 
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into an agreement with the publisher whereby they assigned perpetual worldwide 
exclusive rights to Superman to DC.98  Later in 1938, the duo entered into an 
employment agreement with the publisher to produce similar Superman material on 
a monthly basis, once the resounding success of Action Comics #1 became clear to 
the publisher.99 
Starting in the 1930s, during the period comic book historians have dubbed the 
Golden Age of Comics, comic books were sold side by side with newspapers and 
periodicals at newsstands.100  Popular titles like Superman are estimated to have 
sold one million copies per issue in the Golden Age.101  By 1960, after the Golden 
Age period ended, postal circulation statements indicate Superman still averaged 
810,000 copies per month, a staggering number considering the era predated the 
comic book speculation craze that swept the comics industry in the early 1990s.102 
The Superman character began to invade other media shortly after his success in 
comic books, quickly gaining his own newspaper comic strip and radio serial.103  
The latter debuted the character’s famous introduction, with the phrases “faster than 
a speeding bullet,” “more powerful than a locomotive,” and “Look!  Up in the sky!  
It’s a bird!  It’s a plane!  It’s SUPERMAN!”104  It is difficult to estimate the 
economic value of the Superman franchise.  Superman’s box office history, 
however, might shed some light on the stakes involved.  Since 1978, the Man of 
Steel grossed $870,684,153 in worldwide box office sales in only five total 
cinematic appearances.105  While no copyright owner would expect to reap all or 
even a majority of the revenue from film exploitation, film is but one medium 
where Superman has been successful.106  An accurate valuation of the character’s 
worth would have to take into account television, merchandising, toys, video games 
and all the potential licensees Superman’s owner could do business with.107 
B.  PRIOR ACTIONS 
The character’s success sparked litigation battles that continue to this day.  In 
1947, Siegel and Shuster brought an action against DC in New York Supreme 
Court, Westchester County, seeking to annul the agreement assigning their 
 98. Siegel, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. 
 99. Id. at 1048. 
 100. TODD ALLEN, THE ECONOMICS OF WEB COMICS:  A STUDY OF CONVERTING CONTENT INTO 
REVENUE 12 (2d ed. 2007). 
 101. Id. at 13.  KRENSKY, supra note 88, at 19. 
 102. ALLEN, supra note 100, at 13; see BRADFORD W. WRIGHT, COMIC BOOK NATION:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF YOUTH CULTURE IN AMERICA 279 (2001) (“Publishers were well aware that their 
collectible X-Men issue [X-Men vol. 2 #1 (1991)] did not sell to eight million different consumers.  
Many were purchased by speculators who bought multiple copies in order to hoard them for future sale 
at inflated prices in the collector’s market.”). 
 103. KRENSKY, supra note 88, at 20. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Box Office History for Superman Movies, NUMBERS.COM, http://www.thenumbers.com/ 
movies/series/Superman.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
 106. DANIELS, supra note 1. 
 107. Id. 
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ownership rights in Superman as void for lack of consideration.108  The litigation 
resulted in a finding that the assignment was valid.109  The parties thereafter settled 
and stipulated that DC was the owner of all Superman rights.110  The court vacated 
the earlier finding and the judge entered the settlement.111 
The expiration of the initial copyright term spurred new action in 1969.112  
Siegel and Shuster brought suit in the Federal District Court of New York claiming 
they, not DC, owned the renewal right.113  Under Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 
the court found the pair had assigned their renewal right in the 1938 assignment, 
which was confirmed in the 1948 stipulation.114 
In 1975, the New York Times ran a story about Siegel and Shuster’s “destitute 
living conditions.”115  In response to the bad publicity engendered by the 
publication of the article, DC extended annual payments and medical insurance to 
the duo for the remainder of their lives and promised to credit them as creators of 
Superman, all the while emphasizing the strictly voluntary basis of its actions.116  
Later, Joanne Siegel lobbied for and received surviving spouse benefits.117  Jerome 
Siegel passed away on January 18, 1996.118 
In 1997, under § 304(c) of the 1976 Act, Siegel’s widow and daughter sent 
notices of termination to DC, to be made effective as of April 16, 1999.119  Joe 
Shuster had no heirs as defined by the 1976 Act.120  Following the CTEA, which 
extended the definition of an heir beyond the traditional next of kin designations, 
Shuster’s nephew filed notice of termination in 2003, to be made effective in 
2013.121 
A lengthy attempt at settlement between Siegel and DC ensued.122  The parties 
entered into a tolling agreement in 2000 whereby neither party would assert a 
statute of limitations defense while they continued to negotiate.123  The parties 
could not agree to terms for a regrant of the Superman license.124  The Siegels 
subsequently hired new counsel and proceeded with litigation.125 
 108. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Siegel v. Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d by, 508 
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 113. Id. at 1033. 
 114. Id. at 1036–37. 
 115. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (citing Mary Breasted, Superman’s Creators, Nearly 
Destitute, Invoke His Spirit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1975, at 62). 
 116. Id. at 1113. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1114. 
 120. Id. at 1114 n.3. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1115. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1116. 
 125. Id. 
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C.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 6, 2008, in a motion for partial summary judgment, Judge Larson 
concluded that because promotional announcements featuring a black-and-white 
reproduction of the Action Comics #1 cover depicting Superman lifting a car 
(“Promo-Superman”) were published a few days before the Siegel heirs’ sixty-one 
year window of termination under the notice (April 16, 1938 to April 16, 1999), the 
copyrights to the advertisement were retained by DC.126  DC could continue to 
exploit the Promo-Superman, but the character was merely super strong and wore a 
black and white costume, with no distinctive story elements.127  The court upheld 
the Second Circuit’s determination that Action Comics #1 was not a work made for 
hire, on collateral estoppel grounds.128  Judge Larson also concluded that the U.S. 
termination provision could not reach foreign grants when a U.S. author conferred 
worldwide rights, limiting the effect of the termination and allowing DC to retain 
valuable rights to the character in foreign markets.129  The court concluded issues 
of fact remained for the accounting of profits from exploitation of the work because 
the material was a joint work and DC continued to own Shuster’s one-half 
interest.130  These issues of fact included whether the consideration for the 
Superman movie license was below market value.131 
In assessing the difference in market value between a nonexclusive and an 
exclusive license, it is interesting to note that Judge Larson characterized the 
plaintiffs as co-owners of the copyright in the Superman material published in 
Action Comics #1, and that this material did not include many other important 
aspects of the character, such as his power to fly or vulnerability to Kryptonite.132  
This was the first time the court spelled out that DC and Siegels were to be 
considered co-owners of the material in Action Comics #1.133 
In an August 12, 2009 order resolving additional issues, the court found that the 
Siegel heirs had successfully recaptured Action Comics #1, Action Comics #4, 
Superman #1 (pages three through six only) and the initial two weeks’ worth of 
Superman daily newspaper strips—namely, the material that Siegel and Shuster had 
co-created before becoming employees of DC’s predecessor in interest in late 
 126. Id. at 1123–26. 
 127. Id. at 1126. 
 128. Id. at 1127 (“In the case before us, Superman and his miraculous powers were completely 
developed long before the employment relationship was instituted.  The record indicates that the 
revisions directed by the defendants were simply to accommodate Superman to a magazine format.  We 
do not consider this sufficient to create the presumption that the [comic book] strip was a work for hire.”  
(quoting Siegel v. Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974))). 
 129. Id. at 1140. 
 130. See id. at 1142. 
 131. Id. at 1144–45. Warner Brothers, the parent company of DC, licensed the Superman franchise 
to its subsidiary film studio.  Id.  The court had to rule on whether this was a below market transaction 
between “alter egos” of the same corporate entity.  Id. 
 132. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., No. CV 04-08400-SGL, 2009 WL 2014164, at *15–16 
(C.D. Cal. July 8, 2009). 
 133. Id. 
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1938.134  Ownership of the Superman material that was published from 1938 to 
1943 while Siegel and Shuster were employees of DC remained solely with DC 
because they were works made for hire.135 
In an October 30, 2009 order denying motion for reconsideration, dealing 
primarily with inadequacy of termination notice issues, the court finally appeared 
to decide the issue of the character copyright, separate from the termination of 
individual works.136  Relying heavily on Burroughs, the court said that the 
termination notices listing hundreds of works demonstrated the plaintiffs intended 
to terminate the grant of the Superman character and the world built around him; 
that the copyright in the Superman character was a conglomerate of seventy years 
of exploitation, not “individual copyrightable bits” and that the copyrightable 
aspects of a character are protected only to the extent the work with that particular 
aspect of the character was first delineated remains protected.137 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Section 304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act allows for the continued post-termination 
exploitation of derivative works based on a terminated work, created while a party 
had a valid license, but not for the preparation of new derivative works based on 
the terminated work.138  Between 1999 and 2013 (the putative date that the Shuster 
termination would take effect), DC could exploit the Superman works that it 
exclusively owns (created as works for hire between 1938 to 1999) and continue to 
create new derivative works.139  As co-owner of Superman with the Siegels, DC 
would have to account to them for profits.140  Under Judge Larson’s prior 
reasoning, this accounting would have to distinguish between the elements that the 
Siegels own, primarily introduced in Action Comics #1, and the later distinct 
elements that DC owns. 
After 2013, assuming the Shuster termination is valid and that DC loses any 
copyright interest in Action Comics #1, DC would lose the Superman character 
copyright according to Judge Larson’s latest reasoning, which relies explicitly on 
Burroughs.  DC would still be able to exploit any 1938 to 1999 material it created, 
but as statutory owners of that material, it might not have to account to anyone for 
 134. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 137. Id. at 1058–59, 1066–67, 1068. 
 138. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (2006) (appearing to reject the situation in Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207 (1990), which arose under the 1909 Act and did not deal with a post-termination work; the 
Supreme Court held in that case that so long as a preexisting work was out of the public domain, its use 
was infringing if one who employs the work does not have a valid license or assignment for use of the 
preexisting work, even if the derivative work was inseparably intertwined with the original). 
 139. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
(establishing that DC as co-owner has an independent right to use or license the copyright). 
 140.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976) (“Under the bill, as under the present law, coowners of 
a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each coowner having an independent 
right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any 
profits.”). 
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profits.141  However, DC will lose the right to prepare any new derivative works 
based on the terminated works.  Because the Siegels and Shusters could not use any 
of the new elements featured in the DC material, they would not be able to exploit 
the Superman character as the public knows him either, a poor outcome both for the 
parties involved and for the general public. 
Judge Posner’s Gaiman decision in the Seventh Circuit could provide a rationale 
for both parties to continue legally exploiting the character.142  In that decision, 
Judge Posner determined that a character called Medieval Spawn, a derivative work 
of the Image Comics character Spawn, was a separately copyrighted character.143  
In formulating his standard, Judge Posner asked whether Medieval Spawn was 
“sufficiently distinct” from Spawn.144  He concluded that Medieval Spawn’s 
knightly regalia and medieval speech pattern, which “regular” Spawn did not 
display, was enough to justify a separate character copyright.145  Discussing the 
consequences of his holding for future infringement actions, Judge Posner also 
stated that a character that looks and talks like Spawn would infringe Spawn, and a 
character that looks and talks like Medieval Spawn would infringe Medieval 
Spawn.146  Applying Judge Posner’s interpretation to Superman, DC would be able 
to continue using the version of Superman they have developed during and since 
Siegel and Shuster’s contributions to the character (“Modern Superman”).  The 
Siegels and Shusters would also be able to exploit the version of Superman they 
own (“1938 Superman”) without infringing DC’s material. 
A question arises regarding whether under Gaiman every Superman issue would 
create a separately copyrightable character.  Such a consequence would be absurd.  
The trivial variation rule concerning derivative works could be thought of as 
“merging” different appearances of a character back into a single legally cognizable 
character.  Also, under Burroughs, sequels that merely tell the continuing 
adventures of the same character do not appear to change the rights to the 
underlying work.147  But what happens when there is more than trivial variation?  
Judge Larson, in a separate but related line of cases about the “Superboy” 
character, seemed open to ruling that Superboy was a copyrightable character 
separate from Superman, but ultimately left this question open for more fact 
submission.148  If Superboy, who was little more than a teenaged Superman with 
identical background, powers and physical appearance, could be considered a 
 141.  See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (2009).  There is an ambiguity in § 304(c)(6)(A) regarding 
whether the continued utilization of derivative works by a publisher post-termination requires any 
accounting of profits to authors of the terminated work.  As works made for hire, the vast majority of 
Superman works created between 1938 and 1999 are solely owned by DC. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. 
Entm’t Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 142. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 143.  Id. at 661. 
 144.  Id.  This was despite the fact that Medieval Spawn had no name; the appellation “Medieval 
Spawn” was a descriptor ascribed to him after the fact.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 662.  The court notably did not address whether a character that infringes Medieval 
Spawn would also necessarily infringe Spawn. 
 147. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 148. Siegel v. Time Warner Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
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character separately copyrightable from Superman, then Siegel and Shuster’s 1938 
Superman and DC’s Modern Superman could be thought of as separate characters 
under copyright as well.149 
Perhaps significantly, the original Superman of the Golden Age has already met 
his in-story death within the fictional DC Comics universe.150  The current 
Superman, whose adventures DC currently publishes in the pages of Action Comics 
and Superman, is considered a parallel universe version of the character.151  
Whatever the case, there are significant differences between the 1938 Superman 
and the Modern Superman.  The 1938 Superman cannot fly, does not have heat or 
x-ray vision and wears a different “S” emblem on his chest.152  Important 
secondary elements, such as his bald arch-nemesis Lex Luthor and a crippling 
vulnerability to the debris of his home world, Kryptonite, are also missing.153  On 
the other hand, most of the elements that make Superman distinct from other 
characters of fiction were present from the very beginning, such as Superman being 
the last survivor of a dying planet, immensely strong and bulletproof.154  Has DC 
since then delineated enough distinct elements to have a copyright in a separate 
character? 
DC has introduced more radical variations on Superman in the past.  In 1997, 
DC turned Superman into “Electric Superman,” a white and blue “energy being” 
with electrical powers, including the ability to traverse power lines and split into 
multiple “energy beings.”155  Electric Superman is at least as “sufficiently distinct” 
from Superman as Medieval Spawn is from Spawn. 
DC also legally retains the rights to the Promo-Superman that appeared in 
advertisements before Action Comics #1 and was not recaptured by the Siegels’ 
termination notice; however, what this means as far as character rights are 
concerned is far from clear.156  Promo-Superman, being a fuzzy black-and-white 
reprint of the cover of Action Comics #1, might not be distinctly delineated enough 
 149. Id. at 1113. 
150. The Golden Age Superman’s death came within the pages of 1985’s twelve part Crisis on 
Infinite Earths.  See KLOCK, supra note 38, at 19. 
[The series’] principle aim was to clean up the mess of narrative parallel universes which DC’s 
writers had established over the past forty-five years, in order to start afresh with a single, easy to 
follow continuity.  It achieved this aim by combining all of the possible earths into one, and 
killing off all the characters who didn’t fit. 
Id. 
 151.  Id. at 21–22.  The new Superman debuted in John Byrne's Man of Steel in 1986.  Id.  
Significant changes to the character's milieu included:  excising his career as Superboy, redesigning 
Krypton and eliminating nearly all of his Kryptonian supporting cast, including comic relief characters 
like Krypto the Superdog.  Id. (“Superman’s origin, for example, was retold by John Byrne putting 
Superman in the position of meeting his old enemies for the first time again.”). 
 152. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1111–12 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1104. 
 155. Steve Younis, Superman Blue (and Superman Red), SUPERMAN HOMEPAGE, 
http://www.supermanhomepage.com/comics/comics.php?topic=comics-new_supes (last visited Dec. 4, 
2010). 
 156. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1123–26. 
CHENG --FINAL 2/28/2011  5:56:36 PM 
278 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:2 
 
to achieve character copyright.157  Promo-Superman exists only as a drawing, with 
none of the attendant character traits and elements that would make him valuable as 
a character.158  However, coupled with the copyrighted material they own that was 
produced as work for hire between 1938 and 1999, DC might be able to claim that 
they at least hold some interest in the character, even after the 2013 Shuster 
termination takes effect because the appearance of Promo-Superman is 
chronologically first in time.159  His Promo-Superman appearance, plus the 
character and story elements they do solely own and control, may be enough to 
assert that DC retains copyright to a character that looks and acts much like 
Superman as the public knows him, even after the heirs of the original creators 
succeed in terminating the original assignment of the character. 
A.  WHAT CAN DC DO AFTER 2013? 
If the Modern Superman is a copyrightable character separate from the 1938 
Superman, the derivative works exception might allow DC to continue to create 
new derivative works based on the Modern Superman, even after the 2013 Shuster 
termination.160  DC would have to successfully claim that their continued 
exploitation is based on the Modern Superman character, and not on the 1938 
Superman.  Such a claim appears unlikely to succeed.  Even if DC were to do their 
best to avoid any elements of the material in Action Comics #1, their Superman 
character would still look and act much the same as the 1938 Superman and retain 
many shared elements.  Any subsequent works using the Superman character may 
necessarily be derivative works of the original, barring significant visual 
differences and an entirely different alter ego and origin.161 
The likely result for DC is that they will not be able to create new works, despite 
owning a seventy-year library of the character’s exploits.  At the same time, 
because the Siegels and Shusters would own only the material in Action Comics #1, 
#4 and a handful of comic strips, they would not be able to exploit the Superman 
character franchise to its full extent either. 
B.  WHAT CAN THE SIEGELS AND SHUSTERS DO AFTER 2013? 
After a putative complete termination of the original assignment of Superman by 
the Siegel and Shuster heirs, they could only use the Superman character as he 
appears in the material they own.162  Using any elements in later works would risk 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (2006). 
 161. DC could still argue the “implied grant” construct detailed by the Second Circuit Burroughs 
decision.  See Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 622 (2d Cir. 1982).  A 
successful attempt to do so would strip nearly all of the remunerative power from the termination right 
in this case, an approach that the Ninth Circuit has yet to embrace. 
 162. See Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11 (demonstrating the characteristics of the character that 
were not present in the terminated works). 
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infringing DC’s copyrights.  If the heirs were to license their version of Superman 
for future exploitation, trademark and unfair competition law could also bar them 
from referring to their Superman as “Superman” on packaging, promotional 
materials and titles, despite their ownership of the copyright to the original version 
of the character.163 
The Siegels and Shusters would own a Superman that cannot fly, cannot be 
depicted fighting Lex Luthor or any of Superman’s classic villains and has no 
vulnerability to Kryptonite.164  Many valuable aspects of the Superman character 
would be missing from any post-termination attempts to exploit the character on 
the part of the heirs.165  It could also be very difficult for the Siegels and Shusters 
to take the Superman character to another publisher or licensee because DC’s 
contribution to the character’s mythology would not be included in the bargain. 
C.  SOLUTIONS 
Two possible solutions exist that are potentially amenable to the existing law of 
character copyright.  One idea is to split the character in two—a 1938 Superman 
and a Modern Superman —and allow both sides to create new works based on their 
versions.  This approach would embrace the theory and consequences of Judge 
Posner’s ruling in the Medieval Spawn case.166  A character that flies and has heat 
vision would infringe Modern Superman; a character that leaps tall buildings and 
works at the Daily Star would infringe 1938 Superman.  Since the two characters 
would be legally separate, the Siegel and Shuster heirs would own a one hundred 
percent interest in 1938 Superman.  DC would retain a one hundred percent interest 
in the unterminable works created after 1938.  Because the two sides would have 
no overlapping property interests if the character were severed this way, there 
would be no need to account for profits between DC and the heirs.  The heirs and 
DC would be able to independently exploit their respective versions of the Man of 
Steel. 
The obvious downside to this approach is that it arguably does not achieve one 
of the remunerative goals of termination, as the publisher is left with the more 
valuable version of the character.  However, it is possible that a rival publisher like 
Marvel Comics or Image Comics would be receptive to producing works featuring 
the original Superman, so long as it was relatively safe from legal action from DC.  
Nonetheless, while conceptually defensible, this splitting arrangement would tend 
to hurt creators and their heirs for the betterment of the publisher and the public. 
A more satisfying solution may be to extend the current co-ownership 
arrangement between DC and the Siegel heirs (and then the Siegel heirs and the 
Shuster heirs) to include all three parties once the Shuster termination takes 
effect.167  While the Siegel and Shuster estates could own the early terminated 
 163. Id. at 1142. 
 164. Id. at 1110–11. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 167. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
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works together, and DC could own the work for hire material, the character 
copyright could be jointly owned by all three.  Adopting this approach would 
effectively acknowledge that a character copyright is not a fixation in a tangible 
medium of expression in the same way a painting or book is.168  A character like 
Superman is more than his delineation in one given work.  He is the culmination of 
seventy years of fictional world building, as Judge Larson correctly pointed out.169  
The Superman character exists in the text and art of his adventures, but also he 
encompasses more than any single comic book issue or film or television episode.  
All three parties, as co-owners of the Superman character copyright, would be able 
to draw on the material produced by Siegel, Shuster and DC to create new works, 
subject to the duty of accounting for profits as in a joint authorship arrangement.170 
The downside to this approach is the increased chance of marketplace confusion 
because each co-owner would have the ability to grant nonexclusive licenses.171  
There could be three or more sources of official Superman adventures potentially.  
However, in the context of other joint works, the copyright law is unperturbed by 
this potential outcome, and licensees must obtain the permission of each joint 
author if they want exclusive rights of exploitation.172  Arguably, the relationship 
between the three tenants in common in this scenario is unequal since DC 
unquestionably owns the noncopyright aspects of the character, such as the 
Superman and “S” shield trademarks.173  Trademark and unfair competition law 
could therefore favor the publisher by blocking the Siegel and Shuster heirs from 
exercising their rights in the character without involving DC in the hypothetical 
transaction.174  Militating against this hardship is the fact that the original creators 
would benefit from work that belongs to DC through work made for hire.175 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Due to the unclear consequences of judicial rulings on the rights to the 
Superman character, as separate from Action Comics #1, it seems that the Siegel 
and Shuster heirs and DC only have the right to block one another from using the 
character in future works.  Perhaps this is the desired result.  Faced with owning 
fragments of an otherwise enormously valuable character, the parties have strong 
incentives to negotiate with one another for a regrant of rights, so that new 
derivative works can be prepared based on the character of Superman as the general 
public knows him. 
However, if this is the correct interpretation of the interaction between 
termination and character copyright, then some of the basic goals of the termination 
 168. See id. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”). 
 169. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 170. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, §6.12. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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of transfer provision have been thwarted.  Settlement or a regrant of license would 
resolve the problem, but negotiations between the parties have broken down 
before.176 
The termination right was created as a response to the failures of the 1909 
renewal term.177  A similar failure has occurred here, since the heirs of the original 
creators will not receive a character that is “free and clear” to take to another 
publisher if negotiations break down again.  The heirs are effectively locked into 
negotiating with DC and DC alone, which significantly decreases their bargaining 
power.  DC also receives no exploitable interest in a character that it has 
successfully stewarded for seventy years of publishing history, with many hundreds 
and thousands of works that it bore the financial risk of producing.  Settlement 
should be encouraged when the result is optimal, not because ownership of rights 
are fractured and unclear. 
As of this writing, the estate of legendary creator Jack Kirby has filed its own 
termination lawsuit against Marvel Comics, new owner Walt Disney Co., as well as 
Sony and Fox movie studios for the characters Iron Man, the X-Men, The 
Incredible Hulk, Thor, the Fantastic Four, Spider-Man and nearly all of the most 
iconic characters in the Marvel library of intellectual property.178  Disney’s four 
billion dollar purchase of Marvel, reportedly made with full knowledge that the 
Jack Kirby estate would be sending termination notices, gives one an idea of the 
potential stakes involved in recapturing even a one-half interest in one or more of 
these characters.179  A clear solution is needed.  As high profile litigation in this 
area increases and creators become more aware of their termination rights, the 
threat increases that beloved characters will be locked in unending courtroom 
battles, to the detriment of all, while the labyrinthine provisions of the termination 
right and its unclear interaction with the character copyright get interpreted. 
 
 176. See Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1136–37. 
 177. See id. at 1139. 
 178. Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Disney Faces Rights Issues Over Marvel, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/business/21marvel.html. 
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